Against the Pretended Liberty of Conscience

My EPS 2024 Presentation

Against the Pretended Liberty of Conscience

Stephen Wolfe

I. Statement of the Question

Does the suppression of false religion violate the freedom of conscience? This is a good question but it typically arises from confusion about classical Protestant political theology and from ignorance on how Protestants justified such suppression. Contrary to popular belief, affirming liberty of conscience is not original to our modern era, nor to the Enlightenment, or even to the Baptists. The 16th- and 17th-century Reformers universally affirmed the liberty of conscience, even while insisting that civil magistrates may protect and promote true religion and suppress false religion. Were these brilliant men absurdly inconsistent? No. Suppressing false religion need not violate the sacredness of conscience.

Compelled Religion

It is common today, even among Christian academics, to improp­erly state the question concerning civil government, religion, and conscience. This error goes back centuries. In the 17th century, Samuel Rutherford complained of “ignorant Anabaptists” who claimed that the issue centers on “internal liberty.” The question, to their mind, was (as Rutherford states) “whether the magistrate can force men with the sword to [religious] opinions and cudgel them out of some [opinions and] into other contrary judgments.”[1] Ruther­ford joined the Anabaptists in denying such compulsion. From the early days of the Reformation, magisterial Protestants insisted that magistrates must not compel faith. Every man has an internal liberty. The Reformed confession produced by the Bern Synod of 1532 reflects this early consensus: “[N]o magistrate should compel the conscience, or command and forbid with respect to anything more than what is outward.”[2] All attempts to coerce belief is unjust, for no one can be coerced to believe something.

The chief dispute between classical and modern Christians on the liberty of conscience centers on the relationship of ex­ternal religion and internal religion. My contention is that pro­ponents of religious liberty have asserted a non sequitur for cen­turies, arguing that since inward religious belief cannot be forced, the magistrate cannot use coer­cive power to suppress external false religion. The conclusion, however, does not follow, because it fails to distinguish what Richard Baxter called the “liberty of tongue and practice” and the “liberty of conscience.”[3] The differences here will become more evident as I proceed.

Internal Religion

Internal religion refers to religious acts of the inward man, such as belief, faith, and hope. Only God can directly see these acts; they are in themselves invisible to men, and they fall outside human jurisdiction, given the kind of thing they are. Thus, no civil authority can compel one to perform them. The question, therefore, is not whether civil authority can compel internal religion.

The conscience cannot be subordinated to any external entity—whether civil, social, familial, or ecclesiastical—such that these en­tities dictate to it the judgments of internal religion. No man can defer to them or treat their authority as sufficient grounds for some proposition of faith. Internal religion is grounded in knowledge affirmed by referencing Scripture, not by ref­erencing a mediating authority. Of course, we all have come to believe religious things from the instruction of others, but we do not ground our belief in our trust of them. They are not authorities that mediate truth to us. They were instruments in showing us the truth of Scripture. Thus, the question is not whether one ought to defer to the judg­ment of an external truth-mediating authority for internal religious beliefs.

An internal belief in itself, something visible only to God, affecting only the one who holds it. That is, a belief as a belief—considered only as an internal thing—can bring neither good nor evil to another. Thus, civil authority has no concern with true or false belief in itself, for civil authority concerns itself directly only with outward good and evil. Civil authority has neither cognizance of, nor jurisdic­tion over beliefs themselves. False belief itself must never be the basis of civil punishment. Hence, the question is not whether civil authority can punish one on the basis for false belief itself. Furthermore, since civil power cannot reform hearts, I deny that the direct intent of civil punishment for false religion can be inward reformation.

Nor is the question whether civil rulers can “prosecute crimes against [God]” (as Jonathan Leeman suggests about this position).[4] It is true that some Reformed writers spoke of punishment for “tak[ing] away from God his own honor,” as Calvin said. False religion is indeed a crime against God, but it can also cause harm to one’s fellow man. Hence, we can coherently say that mag­istrates ought not to punish one for the dishonoring of God while affirming that magistrates can restrain false religion in the interest of the public good.

External Religion

External acts of religion are different than internal acts of religion. External religion includes professions of faith, ceremonies of worship, teaching, etc. These are outward and visible and can affect others, and so external religion belongs to the kind of things that external authorities can regulate. Most impor­tantly, such external acts, unlike internal ones, can affect others both internally and externally, for good or for ill. All appropriate civil action against false religion is directed at its external expression to suppress external false religion and thereby prevent harm to the public, both to souls and to the body politic. Suppressing false religion is a means, not an end in itself. Thus, the question is not whether the suppres­sion of external false religion by civil government is a good in itself or ought to be pursued for its own sake; nor is the question whether civ­il government ought to prosecute all expressions of false religion re­gardless of their consequences and circumstances; nor is the question whether civil power can force one to speak outwardly what is true, for that would cause one to lie.

Final Statement of the Question

Given these clarifications, I can offer the fundamental point of division between classical and modern views on the liberty of conscience.

The question is whether a Christian magistrate, having civil rule over a civil society of Christians, may punish with civil power false teachers, heretics, blasphemers, and idolaters for their external expressions of religious error in order to prevent (1) any injury to the souls of the people of God, (2) the subversion of Christian government, Christian culture, or spiritual disci­pline, or (3) civil disruption or unrest.

Modern religious liberty advocates deny this and I affirm it.

II. Principle

Affirming this question requires me to demonstrate both that civil rulers can in principle punish such people and that it is prudent to do so, at least in some circumstances. Something may be permissible but never prudent. This section concerns the principle.

Public Harm

Those in the denial camp typically affirm that civil government ought to regulate outward religious actions that cause public harm. But they limit public harm to physical harm. Andrew Walker states, for example, that “only forms of worship that physically harm oth­ers should be restrained or punished.”[5] He then cites Leeman, who writes, “The God of the Bible gives governments authority to pros­ecute crimes against human beings, not the authority to prosecute crimes against himself. As long as people remain unharmed, false religion should be tolerated publicly and privately.”[6] As far as I can tell, Walker and Leeman limit the extension of public harm to phys­ical harms on the unstated assumption that external false religion cannot cause internal harm or harm to the soul. Since it only harms God, it is not subject to civil action. I do not see how the argument would work otherwise.

I will grant here that civil authorities should not prosecute crimes solely against God. But the assumption that external false religion does not harm souls is clearly false. Christians widely acknowledge that out­ward false religion can harm others. Indeed, we praise families and churches that protect themselves from false teaching, because we know that such teaching can harm people’s souls. Thus, the proper extension of public harm includes harm to the soul, for public ac­tions, such as heretical teaching, can harm the soul.[7]

Thus, by Walker’s stated major premise—namely, that magis­trates may punish those whose actions harm or threaten to harm one’s fellow man—magistrates are permitted to punish external false religion, for it can harm fellow humans. These actions are crimes against God and fellow man, and thus they are subject to punishment on account of the latter.

So my argument is as follows:

(1) Any outward action that has the potential to cause harm to others is rightfully subject to civil restraint or punishment (in principle).

(2) External false religion has the potential to cause harm to others.

Therefore, (3) external false religion is rightfully subject to civil restraint or punishment.

The major premise extends to all actions that cause harm, includ­ing those outward acts that express inward religious beliefs, because there is no good reason to limit it. It cannot be, “You cannot com­pel the conscience,” for the conscience is not compelled, since only external expression is targeted. Nor can it be, “You cannot punish beliefs,” for the belief itself is neither the ground of the civil action nor the object of the action. Nor can it be, “People ought to be able to express their beliefs,” for this would require us, for example, to tolerate inciters of political violence. Expressions of false religion are outward, and so they are subject to civil jurisdiction given the kind of action they are; and because they can harm others, they are in prin­ciple subject to civil restraint and punishment.

As for the minor premise, there is no question that those who ac­tively and outwardly espouse damnable error can lead people astray. Even those who are eternally secure—those “kept by the power of God” (1 Pet. 1:5)—can be diverted from the narrow path to the Celestial City. Christian parents regularly act to keep their children from such people, ordering the household into an exclusively Christian space. Within the extent of their powers and vigilance, they eliminate anti-Christian influences so that children are raised in the fear of the Lord. Civil authorities, having civil power over civil space, can and ought to do likewise.

Stating the Principle

I’ll state the principle directly:

The civil magistrate may restrain outward expressions of false religion that, in his judgment, (1) can injure souls, (2) are subversive to Christian civil government, Christian culture, and sacred ministry, or (3) threaten civil disruption and un­rest; and he restrains in order to establish or maintain the best outward conditions for his people to live “a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty” (1 Tim. 2:2).

I’ll offer some clarifying remarks. First, the magistrate “may” do this be­cause all civil action is a matter of principle and prudence. Second, the “best outward conditions” are conditions that prepare for faith, order people to the means of grace, eliminate distractions from faith and worship, secure sacred ministry, and nor­malize Christianity. Third, in addition to inward harm, false religion can cause outward harm. The New England authorities in the 17th century acted against people like Rog­er Williams and the Antinomians in part from fear that their religious teachings might undermine Christian civil authority and threaten civil discipline.

III. Prudence

The Necessity of Prudence

Prudence is relevant because all civil action is a means to an end, and the means must conduce to that end. The effectiveness of means de­pends on the circumstances in which the means operate.

The principle above does not demand a universal set of policies that eradicate all false religion. Suppressing false religion is not an end in itself, but a means to a godly and tranquil public life. Civil actions that threaten the very existence of the commonwealth violate the very ends sought in the action, for the false religionists may overthrow the state and attack the church.

Civil action against false religion is prudent only if it conduces concretely to the good of the church. In all situations, Christian civil rulers must set their eyes on the end. Of course, this caution should not undermine the resolve of magis­trates to perform their duty, nor should it serve as an excuse for pas­sivity under the pretense of irenicism and civil peace, both of which are means to human good, not ends in themselves.

The idea that Reformed magistrates had no flexibility with re­gard to religious diversity is a myth. Indeed, in the 16th and 17^th centuries, inflexibility was a common Roman Catholic position, particularly among Jesuits. But in Protestantism the church is essentially invisible and composed of the elect by faith, and belonging to that church is not conditioned on or grounded in one’s outward belong­ing to a visible, centralized, and global communion. Thus, Protes­tants of different doctrinal persuasions and practices can mutually recognize their shared faith. This is the basis for principled toler­ation and religious liberty in Protestant commonwealths. The point here is that Protestant magistrates rul­ing a Protestant people have principled flexibility when faced with religious diversity.  

Conclusion

Here are some concluding thoughts. On this issue, we must

1) state the question properly (frankly, no recent work from evangelicals of which I’m aware has got it right), and we must frame the issue with certain key distinctions: internal/external religion, the means and ends of policy, and, lastly principle and prudence.

2) Everyone here, I assume, is fine with certain beliefs being suppressed, if not by law as least by society. If we did a public poll here, most people would agree that suffering societal consequences for racist beliefs is good and ordinarily conduces to the good of society. Most would, when given the opportunity, join in exacting these social costs. But strangely, few would do this for atheists (whose moral views and social policies are generally atrocious), outright heretics, pro-abortion advocates, transgender advocates, or many other socially acceptable positions. But which moral principle permits the public shaming of some but not others?

3) Lastly, the question of religion liberty is not answered with emotive appeals to the imago dei or declaring that postwar liberalism just happens to be the timeless politics of Jesus. It’s a question of covenant theology, of the origin and the scope of civil power, and of the prudence of civil action. The discussion would move forward if we recentered the issue here rather than on notions of winsomeness, dignity, and democracy.

Thank you.

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[1] Rutherford, Against Pretended Liberty of Conscience, 46. A modern Baptist, Russell Moore, recently wrote that some would “pretend to enforce the kingdom [of God] with tanks or guns. . . . ” Quoted in Walker, Liberty for All, 32.

[2] “The Bern Synod (1532),” in Reformed Confessions of the 16th and 17th Centuries in English Translation, ed. James T. Dennison, vol. 1, 1523–1552 (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2008), 231.

[3] Richard Baxter, A Holy Commonwealth (London, 1659), 278. He continues: “Men’s consciences are not under inspection or cognizance of the Magistrate. He that will be an Infidel, must have liberty of conscience to damn himself, and then to torment himself whether the Magistrate will or no: But if he have liberty to infect and seduce others, the Magistrate shall answer for it.”

[4] Jonathan Leeman, Political Church: The Local Assembly as Embassy of Christ’s Rule (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVaristy Press, 2016), 204. Quoted in Walker, Liberty for All, 55.

[5] Walker, Liberty for All, 54.

[6] Jonathan Leeman, Political Church: The Local Assembly as Embassy of Christ’s Rule (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2016), 204.

[7] In other words, all public actions that cause harm are public harms; some public ac­tions that cause harm are actions that harm the soul; therefore, some public harms are actions that harm the soul.